L'Économie Internationale pour toustes

The situation in Eastern Congo

From its very beginnings, the country now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo has had a very special destiny.

The personal property of King Leopold II of Belgium under the name of Etat Indépendant du Congo, the country was soon subject to the profitability of massive foreign exploitation1.

From the outset, the Congo’s natural resources were the object of major greed, with intensive cultivation of rubber, ivory and timber for commercial purposes2.

The atrocities that took place in the Congo Free State in the late 19th and early 20th centuries can be read in the light of a policy pursued by the former Belgian king and his entourage to extract maximum revenue from the exploitation of Congo’s rubber, whatever the means.

It was against this backdrop that the regime of the former first president of Zaire3, Joseph Mobutu, who came to power following his country’s independence from Belgium, used its authoritarian power for massive resource grabbing purposes, in close collaboration with both national and international players4.

The current resurgence of conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be understood as the transformation and adaptation of colonial and post-colonial forms of violence, directed at both the Congolese territory and its inhabitants.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is located in the Great Lakes region, itself divided between several countries that gained independence in the sixties5.

Following the Rwandan revolution between 1959 and 1961, a first wave of Tutsi refugees settled in neighbouring countries, later forming the basis of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, with ambitions from the outset to return to their homeland6.

These population movements destabilized the already precarious political balance in neighboring countries, and were a powerful catalyst for increased inter-ethnic tensions in the region.

The North and South Kivu7 zones, already the object of multiple appetites from local, national and international groups, will consequently see a significant increase in violence at all levels of society.

The presence of numerous mineral resources8 in this part of the Democratic Republic of Congo makes the region particularly attractive, and makes it prone to predatory enrichment drives that destabilize the region and prevent any form of economic, political and social equilibrium.

But this destabilization has not prevented local populations from adapting accordingly and finding ways of integrating themselves into these new economies9.

This is sometimes reflected in the multiplication of activities close to mining areas, where the predatory violence of militias is exerted on civilian populations.

The end of the Mobutu era and the arrival of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, supported by neighboring Rwanda and Uganda as part of the First Congo War, led to an acceleration of systemic violence in the Kivu region.

Events were marked by the active participation of foreign powers and non-state groups in the Congolese political scene.

Among these, Laurent Nkunda’s RCD10 forces played a particularly important role, clashing head-on with Congolese state forces.

This particular configuration of Eastern Congo, with the participation of state, international and national military actors, will lead to the disappearance of several million Congolese civilians, victims of the dictates of political rivalries on their territory11.

Local Kivu populations regularly accuse local elites of treason, largely because of their involvement in the exploitation of the Kivu region’s resources for personal gain, in collaboration with foreign or national actors12.

One of the fundamental markers of the considerable instability in the Kivu region lies in the Congolese state’s difficulty in coping with incursions by armed forces backed by neighboring countries.

This is particularly true of the current situation, where after surrendering their weapons in 2012, the M2313 rebels have increased their areas of control in eastern Congolese territory, thanks to the decisive support of the Rwandan Defense Forces14.

The virtual withdrawal of Congolese government forces illustrates the reality of a situation in which the inhabitants of the Kivu region have no one to rely on but themselves, as they are regularly the object of internal and external aggression.

On the one hand, Rwanda maintains that the FDLR15 is an existential threat that it cannot allow to flourish on its border; on the other, the Congolese government blames the Rwandan state for financing the destabilization of its country and its borders.

The resumption of fighting in the Kivus represents a terrible acceleration of violence for the populations of eastern Congo, with the consequent use of systematic rape as a weapon of war and attempts by several competing entities to monopolize mining resources16.

A fundamental feature of regional instability is that armed groups finance their activities by appropriating mining resources.

This state of affairs gives rise to deep-seated rivalries within these groups, with frequent clashes between rival factions17.

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and particularly in its easternmost region, is an illustration of the difficulties that post-independence African states18 can face in controlling and managing their territory, inter-ethnic rivalries and competing economic, political and geostrategic interests.

The multiplication of state and non-state actors further complicates the equation for local populations, who are adapting as best they can to the new circumstances presented to them.

These temporary and emergency situations are unfortunately indicative of the many and complex structural problems preventing the establishment of legal, social and economic stability for local populations.

The actions of the various armed forces are taking place in a context of widespread violence19 at several levels of society, hampering any prospect of a stable future for the local population.

The various United Nations peacekeeping missions, with the participation of many of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s neighbors, have also failed to stem the country’s worrying situation.

Viewed solely from a security or humanitarian angle, conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of the Congo requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses not only military issues linked to the historical-political context, but also economic and social aspects20.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, and particularly the Kivu region, is therefore the subject of all kinds of covetousness, preventing any proposal for a common vision and favoring the discretionary resolution or simply the non-resolution of its endemic problems.

Regional situations are frequently approached from an ethnic angle, rather than as part of an overall state vision whose priority is the general economic well-being of the population.

The presence of rare minerals essential to the manufacture of high-tech electronic equipment tends to accentuate the logic of predation and violence in the Kivu region, adding to an already tense regional situation.

Failure to take into account the multiplicity of factors leading to an increase in inter-ethnic, sexual, economic, and social violence in the Kivu region compromises all prospects of resolving the conflict, the first victims of which are the Congolese civilian population.

  1. ‘Congo : Les Conséquences Du Passé Tragique Du Caoutchouc – BBC News Afrique’, accessed 29 November 2024 ↩︎
  2. ‘’Il Pleut Des Mains Sur Le Congo’ : L’ethnocide Colonial Belge Oublié | TV5MONDE – Informations’, accessed 29 November 2024  ↩︎
  3. Named by Mobutu in the early 1970s ↩︎
  4. ‘Les Minerais, Une Malédiction Pour La République Démocratique Du Congo ? | TV5MONDE – Informations’, accessed 29 November 2024 ↩︎
  5. Rwanda Burundi Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda ↩︎
  6. ‘FPR/APR : Front Patriotique Rwandais et Armée Patriotique Rwandaise | Sciences Po Violence de Masse et Résistance – Réseau de Recherche’, accessed 29 November 2024 ↩︎
  7. Geographically located in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo ↩︎
  8. Coltan, Gold and Tin ↩︎
  9. Theodore Trefon, ‘The Political Economy of Sacrifice: Kinois &the State’, Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 93–94 (1 September 2002): 481–98 ↩︎
  10. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie supported by Rwanda ↩︎
  11. ‘6 millions de morts au Congo’, France Inter, 20 November 2014 ↩︎
  12. Stephen Jackson, ‘Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy’, Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 93–94 (1 September 2002): 517–36 ↩︎
  13. The March 23rd movement was founded by former officers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who had joined the rebellion and were allegedly supported by Rwanda. ↩︎
  14. ‘Dans l’est de La RDC, Violents Combats Entre Le M23 et Les Milices Progouvernementales’, accessed 29 November 2024 ↩︎
  15. Forces de Libération Démocratique du Rwanda, founded by Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo ↩︎
  16. Judith Verweijen, ‘Military Business and the Business of the Military in the Kivus’, Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 135 (1 March 2013): 67–82 ↩︎
  17. Pritish Behuria, ‘Centralising Rents and Dispersing Power While Pursuing Development? Exploring the Strategic Uses of Military Firms in Rwanda’, Review of African Political Economy 43, no. 150 (1 October 2016): 630–47 ↩︎
  18. Chris Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa’, Review of African Political Economy 26, no. 81 (1 September 1999): 367–84 ↩︎
  19. Ann Laudati, ‘Beyond Minerals: Broadening “Economies of Violence” in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’, Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 135 (1 March 2013): 32–50 ↩︎
  20. Miles Larmer, Ann Laudati, and John F. Clark, ‘Neither War nor Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Profiting and Coping amid Violence and Disorder’, Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 135 (1 March 2013): 1–12 ↩︎